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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal by virtue of the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(j)(Rep.Vol. 9 2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court below err in imposing a constructive trust in the absence of a 
finding or any evidence that the grantor and grantees of the subject property were in a 
confidential relationship? In an equity proceeding, appellate courts do not engage in a 
review of the evidence which duplicates the task of the trial court. Rather, it assesses the 
quality and quantity of the evidence to determine whether it clearly preponderates against 
the trial court's finding that the appropriate standard of proof has been satisfied. A 
determination by the appellate court that the evidence clearly preponderates against a trial 
court's finding requires a smaller quantum of contrary evidence, and a less stringent 
appraisal of its quality, when the trial court's finding is based upon a clear and convincing 
standard, rather than a preponderance of the evidence standard. In re Estate of Hock, 655 
P .2d l l l l , 1115n.l (Utah 1982). 
Issue preserved throughout trial. 
2. Was there sufficient evidence presented below to warrant the imposition of 
a constructive trust? In an equity proceeding, appellate courts do not engage in a review 
of the evidence which duplicates the task of the trial court. Rather, it assesses the quality 
and quantity of the evidence to determine whether it clearly preponderates against the trial 
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court's finding that the appropriate standard of proof has been satisfied. A determination 
by the appellate court that the evidence clearly preponderates against a trial court's 
finding requires a smaller quantum of contrary evidence, and a less stringent appraisal of 
its quality, when the trial court's finding is based upon a clear ^nd convincing standard, 
rather than a preponderance of the evidence standard. In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 
1111, 1115n.l(1982). 
Issue preserved throughout trial. 
3. Did the Court below err in failing to find that the claim for a constructive 
trust was barred by the statute of limitations? Whether a statute of limitations has expired 
is a question of law that appellate courts review for correctness giving no particular 
deference to the lower court. Spears v. Warn 2002 UT 24. 
Issue preserved at R. 534. 
4. Did the Court below err in imposing sanctions oi^  the plaintiffs for failure to 
participate in a court ordered mediation in good faith? Sanction orders are reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App. 152. 
Issue preserved at R. 1313. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The order of the Court below which is the subject of this appeal is the imposition 
of a constructive trust upon real property in favor of Arnold D^vayne Rawlings 
("Dwayne"), Paulette Rawlings, Theron LaRell Rawlings ("LaRell"), Bryce C. Rawlings 
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and Carol Lynn R. Masterson (collectively known as the third party plaintiffs). The third 
party plaintiffs alleged that a 1967 warranty deed executed in favor of Donald Rawlings 
and Jeanette Rawlings by Arnold Rawlings and his wife, Cleo Rawlings, was intended to 
convey property in trust for the benefit of Cleo Rawlings and all of her children, including 
the third party plaintiffs. The issue was tried to the Court in a four day bench trial from 
March 12, 2007 through March 15, 2007. The court entered its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order certifying its order as a final judgment, pursuant to the 
provisions of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on August 24, 2007. 
Notice of Appeal was filed on September 4, 2007. 
On March 24, 1967, Arnold Rawlings and his wife, Cleo Rawlings, executed a 
warranty deed in favor of their son, Donald Rawlings, and his wife, Jeanette Rawlings, 
for the property which is the subject of this appeal. On that same day, each of Arnold and 
Cleo's other children (and Dwayne Rawlings' spouse, Paulette) executed quit claim deeds 
for this same property in favor of Donald Rawlings and Jeanette Rawlings. (R. 1449, 
Exhibits 12 and 13). 
While the warranty deed was absolute on its face, two of the third party plaintiffs 
testified that their father told them that the property was being deed to Donald to avoid 
having the property being taken by the welfare department, which was paying for 
Arnold's cancer treatment. LaRell Rawlings testified that his father offered to give him 
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the property outright, but ultimately decided to deed it to Donald "to take care of mother, 
and then us, after she passed away." (R. 1449, Trans. Vol. I, at p. 50). 
Dwayne Rawlings testified that on approximately March 22, 1967, his father "just 
said that they were going to put it in Donald's name, and that he had to get it out of his 
name. They were going to put it in Donald's name, and it would be held for the family." 
(R. 1451, Trans. Vol. II, p. 381.) The other two Rawlings children admitted that their 
father never told them anything about the property being held ih trust. (R. 1451, Trans. 
Vol. II, pp. 257-58; 307.) 
Carol Masterson admitted that her mother, Cleo, always insisted that the property 
was deeded to Donald and Jeanette because they had paid off the mortgage on the 
property. 
Q. But every time that that question came up, your mother 
consistently said that the property was deeded to 
Donald and Jeanette because they paid off the 
mortgage; isn't that true? 
A. That's true. 
(R. 1451, Trans. Vol. II, p. 308.) 
LaRell Rawlings admitted as much as well. Talking about his mother, LaRell testified as 
follows: 
Q. And the story she told was that the property was 
deeded to Donald and Jeanette because they paid off 
the mortgage? 
A. Correct. 
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(R. 1449, Trans. Vol. I, 148.) 
Bryce Rawlings concurred. 
Q. My question is really, that your mother has told you, 
has she not, that the reason the property was deeded to 
Donald and Jeanette was because they paid off the 
mortgage? 
A. That's what she always said. 
(R. 1451, Trans. Vol. II, pp. 263-64.) 
The evidence presented regarding payment of the mortgage was that Arnold 
Rawlings approached Donald Rawlings in approximately April of 1966 about needing 
money to make mortgage payments to Walker Bank. Donald testified that he gave his 
father money a couple of times and when his father asked a third time, Donald went to the 
bank to talk to an employee about his father's loan. (R.1459, Trans. Vol. HI, pp. 535-36.) 
Jeanette Rawlings testified that thereafter she made 7 payments on the mortgage (Fxhibits 
72 through 78) concluding with a $579.06 payment on December 29, 1966, at which time 
she received a deed of reconveyance from the bank. (R. 1459, Trans. Vol. Ill, pp. 611-
13; Exhibit 51.) 
In addition to these payments, Jeanette Rawlings testified that on March 24, 1967, 
she paid $1,267.00 to take care of back taxes, of which she received reimbursement of 
$500.00 from Dwayne Rawlings (R. 1459, Trans. Vol. HI, p. 614). Dwayne Rawlings 
testified that he gave her $1,000.00. (R. 1459, Trans. Vol. Ill, p. 418.) 
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By 1974, a controversy had developed regarding the Vineyard Meadows 
subdivision which had been developed on the southern border of the subject property 
Donald Rawlings asked each of the third party plaintiffs to sign a second quit claim deed, 
with a corrected property description, to assist him in litigation with lot owners who he 
alleged were encroaching on the subject property. Each did so. (R. 1459, Trans. Vol. Ill, 
p. 556.) This litigation resulted in the recovery by Donald of approximately $52,000.00, 
(R. 1459, Trans. Vol. Ill, p. 585). 
In 1978 Donald and Jeanette Rawlings deeded one of the lots from the subject 
property to Dwayne and Paulette and themselves in joint tenancy. This lot was used as 
partial consideration for a different lot on which Donald and Dwayne operated a business 
for a number of years. (R. 1459, Trans. Vol. Ill, pp. 449-52.) None of the other third 
party plaintiffs received any interest in this property or the business operated thereon. 
In addition to the evidence of conversations between D^vayne and LaReli with 
their father, third party plaintiffs believe their claim was supported by evidence that 
Arnold Rawlings continued to use and refer to the property as Jiis own even after 1967 
(Exhibits 19 through 29); that each of the third party plaintiffs continued to have access to 
the property to pick fruit for their mother's benefit; and that Donald told Dwayne that the 
execution of the 1974 quit claim deeds was necessary to protect "mother's farm." 
Donald and Jeanette Rawlings acknowledge that such evidence was admitted at 
trial, but deny such facts give rise to any inference which supports their claim. 
-6-
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Third party plaintiffs presented no evidence of the existence of a confidential 
relationship between the grantor and the grantees of the subject warranty deed, and the 
court below made no finding of such a relationship, which is required by Utah law as a 
predicate for the imposition of a constructive trust. 
The evidence offered by the third party plaintiffs was insufficient, as a matter of 
law, to sustain their burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that a deed 
absolute on its face was intended as a conveyance in trust. Our Supreme Court has held 
that the unsubstantiated claims of purported beneficiaries of a trust cannot meet the 
evidentiary burden imposed by Utah law. 
The third party plaintiffs were on notice as of 1980 that Donald Rawlings was 
treating the subject property as his own, and inconsistently with the existence of a trust 
relationship. Accordingly, the third party plaintiffs' claim was long since barred by the 
statute of limitations. 
The Court below abused its discretion by imposing sanctions on Donald and 
Jeanette Rawlings for asserted bad faith in a mediation. They attended the mediation, as 
ordered, and had no obligation to make settlement proposals at such mediation. The 
failure to do so cannot subject them to sanctions. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO OFFER ANY 
EVIDENCE THAT A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP 
EXISTED BETWEEN THE GRANTOR AND GRANTEES. 
The Court ordered the imposition of a constructive trust despite the complete 
absence of any finding or any evidence that a confidential relationship existed between 
Arnold Rawlings and Donald and Jeanette Rawlings, as requirpd by Utah law. In Ashton 
v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987), our Supreme Court expressly adopted the position 
expressed in Restatement 2d, Trusts §45, which provides as follows: 
Effect of Failure of Oral Trust for a Third Person 
(1) Where the owner of an interest in land transfers it inter 
vivos to another in trust for a third person, but n^ ) 
memorandum properly evidencing the intention to create a 
trust is signed, as required by the Statute of Frauds, and the 
transferee refuses to perform the trust, the transferee holds the 
interest in trust for the third person, if, but only if, 
(b) the transferee at the time of the transfer was 
in a confidential relation to the transferor. 
(emphasis added). 
As noted by Utah's Supreme Court, in Nielson v. Rasmussen, 558 P.2d 511 (Utah 
1976), before a trial court may properly impose a constructive trust consistently with 
§45(b) of the Restatement, the court would have to find, by clear and convincing 
evidence, 
that the defendants at the time of the transfer of the property 
to them by plaintiffs . . . orally agreed to hold said lots in trust 
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for [plaintiffs] and were in a confidential relationship to the 
plaintiffs. 
558P.2dat513. 
As there was no evidence offered that Donald and Jeanette Rawlings agreed to 
hold the property in trust or that they were in a confidential relationship with Arnold 
Rawlings, there was no basis for the Court to impose a constructive trust. The only 
evidence relating to Donald's relationship with his father came from LaRell, who testified 
that their relationship was not close (R. 1449, Trans. Vol. I, p. 140). 
While the third party plaintiffs asserted below that the fact that Arnold was 
Donald's father meant that they were in a confidential relationship, such is not Utah law. 
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Froyd v. Barnhurst, 28 P.2d 135, 136 (Utah 
1934), "the mere relationship of parent and child does not constitute evidence of. . . 
confidential relationship . . ." 
This principle was further expressed by the Court in Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 401 
P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1965), wherein the Court noted, in reversing the trial court, that the 
mere relationship of parent and child does not constitute 
evidence of such confidential relationship as to create a 
presumption of fraud or undue influence. While kinship may 
be a factor in determining the existence of a legally significant 
confidential relationship, there must be a showing, in addition 
to the kinship, [of] a reposal of confidence by one party and 
the resulting superiority and influence on the other party. 
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This showing is absent in the present case. Accordingly, the rule set forth in the 
Restatement has no application to this matter. As noted in Froyd, supra, the 
[o]wner of property has a right to dispose of it during his 
lifetime as he sees fit, even though his act may, in itself, seem 
to be unfair and unreasonable with reference to the interest of 
other children than the one to whom the conveyance is made. 
28 P.2d at 137 [quoting Hatch v. Hatch. 148 P. 433 (Utah 1914|)]. 
POINT II. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OFFERED TO 
MEET THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS' BURDEN OF PROOF. 
The second reason that the third party plaintiffs can't succeed on a constructive 
trust theory is because Utah law requires that in order to establish that a deed which is 
absolute on its face was intended to be a conveyance in trust, a party must prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that such was the grantor's intent. If the only evidence 
purporting to establish such intent is the self-serving testimony of the purported 
beneficiaries of the alleged trust, the claim fails as a matter of law. In Jewell v. Horner, 
366 P.2d 594 (Utah 1961), the plaintiffs sought to impose a constructive trust on property 
their father had deeded to their sister, claiming that the conveyance was intended to be in 
trust for the benefit of all the children. The trial court had imposed a constructive trust 
and the defendants appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the testimony of 
the plaintiffs regarding their father's alleged intent failed as a rtiatter of law to meet the 
burden of proof required to impose a constructive trust. The Court noted that 
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to justify a Court in determining from oral testimony that a 
deed which purports to convey land absolutely in fee simple 
was intended to be something different, such as a trust, such 
testimony must be clear and convincing. That proof must be 
something more than a modicum of evidence which this Court 
sometimes holds to be sufficient to warrant a finding where 
the matter is not so serious as the overthrow of a clearly-
expressed deed, solemnly executed and delivered. 
366 P.2d at 597. 
The Court held that the self-serving testimony of the alleged beneficiaries, coupled 
with ambiguous testimony of third parties, could not meet this rigorous standard. 
Drawing on prior Utah authority, the Court reiterated that 
the proof must be strong, clear, and convincing, such as to 
leave no doubt of the existence of the trust. Such a case is 
similar to one where it is attempted to convert a deed absolute 
on its face into a mortgage, or where the reformation of a 
written instrument is sought on the ground of accident, 
mistake, or fraud. In all such cases the court will scrutinize 
parol evidence with great caution, and the plaintiff must fail 
unless it is clear, definite, unequivocal, and conclusive. 
Public policy, and the safety and security of titles to real 
estate, demand this rule, because such evidence is offered to 
overcome the strong presumption, arising from the terms and 
conditions of an instrument in writing, which is always the 
best evidence of title. If it were once established that the 
effect of a written instrument could be avoided by a bare 
preponderance of parol evidence, the gates to perjury would 
soon be wide open, and no person could longer rest in the 
security of his title to property, however solemn might be the 
instrument on which it was founded. 
366 P.2d at 597-98. 
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The Court also restated the obvious problems associated with the unsubstantiated 
testimony of the alleged beneficiaries, whose testimony is 
so capable of inaccuracy, so susceptible of fabrication, so 
impossible of contradiction, where the person alleged to have 
made the admission is dead. 
Id. at 598. 
In the instant case there is no third-party testimony that supports the claims of the 
third-party plaintiffs. In fact, the clear thrust of the evidence i$ to the contrary. Their 
mother, the wife of the grantor, has repeatedly stated that the property was deeded to 
Donald because he paid off the mortgage. At the same time as this deed was granted, the 
third-party plaintiffs quit claimed any interest in the very property they now seek. The 
deed was prepared by a lawyer. "Had the father intended his spns to have an interest in 
the property, it would have been a simple matter for the attorney to have so provided in 
the deed." Id. 
While the trial court apparently was not convinced that Donald and Jeanette 
Rawiings paid off the mortgage (though there was no evidence that they didn't), this is of 
no significance because they had no burden to prove anything. Arnold Rawiings was free 
to give them the property if he so chose. 
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POINT III. THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM WAS BARRFD BY 
LIMITATIONS. 
In approximately 1973, a dispute arose between Donald Rawlings and lot owners 
in the Vineyard Meadows subdivision over whether those lot owners were encroaching on 
the property of Donald and Jeanette Rawlings. In January of 1974, each of the third party 
plaintiffs signed a second quit claim deed to Donald and Jeannette Rawlings, with a 
corrected property description. Donald Rawlings commenced litigation against the 
property owners. The lawsuits ultimately resulted in settlements with payment of 
approximately $52,000.00 in exchange for deeds from Donald and Jeanette to the lot 
owners of the disputed ground. Donald gave Dwayne $600.00 of the proceeds, Carol and 
Bryce $500.00 and tendered $500.00 to LaRell, who refused it. He also paid $10,000.00 
to his mother. This occurred in January of 1980. As of that date, each of the third party 
plaintiffs was on notice that Donald was not treating the property as trust property but was 
dealing with it as he saw fit. Accordingly, the third party plaintiffs' claim expired, at the 
latest, in 1984. 
Under Utah law, a claim for breach of an alleged trust is four years. See Utah 
Code Ann. §78-12-25 (Rep. Vol. 9 2002). This statute begins to run when the alleged 
"beneficiary knows or through reasonable investigation could have learned of a breach or 
repudiation." Snow v. Rudd. 998 P.2d 262, 267 (Utah 2000). 
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When the third party plaintiffs became aware that Donald had conve) 
subject property without their consent and without making an equitable distribution of the 
proceeds from that sale, they were clearly on notice that he was repudiating any alleged 
duty he had to hold the property in trust. LaRell Rawlings has admitted as much. 
LaRell testified that he thought he should have receive^ his proportionate share of 
the proceeds of the sale of the property. 
Q. Okay. So if [Donald] got a lot of money for the 
property, you felt you were entitled to your share of the 
money? 
A. If there was money, I figured it would have been fair, 
if it was going to be disbursed at that time, from that 
lawsuit, I would have thought it would h^ve been a fair 
amount. 
Q. Did you - - a fair amount being your proportionate 
share? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you concerned that some of the property in 
which you thought you had an interest was being used 
in a manner that was not beneficial to you? 
A. I thought that, yes. 
(R. 1449, Trans. Vol. I, pp. 162, 166.) 
In Snow, supra, the Court emphasized that the plaintiffs lack of reasonable inquiry 
in the face of knowledge that the property in which she had an interest had been sold 
precluded her from asserting that her cause of action didn't accrue until she had actual 
knowledge of the terms of a trust. 
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[Tjhere can be no doubt that, as a matter of law, she had 
knowledge as of 1985 of all facts necessary to put her on 
notice to inquire as to whether the sale of the house to her 
sister breached the trust. She knew nothing in 1993 she did 
know in 1985 . . . 
998 P.2d 262 (Utah 2000). 
Once placed on inquiry notice, an alleged beneficiary of a trust cannot avoid that 
statute of limitation by simply asserting that the statute is tolled because the alleged 
trustee stands in a fiduciary relationship with the beneficiary. As stated by the Colorado 
Supreme Court, 
An action on any trust accrues at such time as the claimant 
attains, or reasonably could have attained, notice of the 
trustee's use of the property in a manner which is inconsistent 
with the claimant's interest. 
Lucas v. Abbott. 601 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Colo. 1979). 
Third party plaintiffs had such notice in 1980 and their purported cause of action 
accrued at that time. 
POINT IV. THE COURT BELOW ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
IMPOSING SANCTIONS. 
The trial court imposed sanctions on Donald and Jeanette Rawlings for what was 
characterized as their bad faith in connection with a court ordered mediation. It is 
undisputed that they, in fact, attended the mediation. While Rule 101(h) authorizes a 
court to order parties who fail to attend mediation to show cause why they failed to attend 
and, if appropriate, why sanctions should not be imposed, the Rule does not address the 
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situation where one party believes another isn't being "reasonable." Neither a * u , „ . a 
mediator can require a party to take any particular position in a mediation and kuk 
101(g) specifies that a party may terminate a mediation "at any time." 
The order imposing sanctions was not authorized by any rule or statute and is 
inconsistent with the Rule itself. Accordingly, it was an abuse of discretion which should 
be vacated by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
In the trial court there was almost a complete absence of any evidence that Arnold 
Rawlings intended to convey his property in trust when he conveyed it by warranty oocd 
to Donald and Jeanette Rawlings, and there was complete absence of evidence, as 
required by Utah law, that a confidential relation existed between the deed's grantor and 
grantees. In the absence of such a relationship, an oral attempt to create an express trust 
is barred by the statute of frauds even if the intent to create such a trust can be proven, as 
required, by clear and convincing evidence, which was not presented in this case. The 
judgment entered below should be reversed. 
DATED this 28th day of January, 2008. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
BY W i tw/^Xc/ • 
M. David Eckersley ^ — 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Donald Rawlings and Jeanette Rawlings 
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ADDENDUM 
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P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, Utah 84603-1266 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
IN THE FOURTH JUDTCTAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD RAWLINGS and JEANETTE 
RAWLINGS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ARNOLD DWAYNE RAWLINGS and 
PAULETTE RAWLINGS, 
Defendants. 
ARNOLD DWAYNE RAWLINGS and 
PAULETTE RAWLMGS, as Trustees of the 
Arnold Dwayne Rawlings Family Trust, 
THERON LaRELL RAWLINGS, BRYCE C. 
RAWLINGS, and CAROL LYNN R. 
MASTERSON, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CiUlNo 970400260 
Division No 9 
M. DAYLE JEFFS, #1655 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
Attorneys for Third-Party Plaintiffs 
Theron LaRcll Rawlings, Bryce C. Rawlings, 
and Carol Lynn R. Mastcrson 
90 North 100 East 
P O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (S01) 373-8848 
Facsimile: (801)373-8878 
vs 
DONALD RAWUNGS and JEANETTE 
RAWLINGS, mid DONALD RAWLINGS 
and JEANETTE RAWLINGS as Trustees of a 
Trust whose name is unknown, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
THERON LARELL RAWLINGS, BRYCE C. 
RAWLINGS, and CAROL LYNN R 
MASTERSON, 
Third Party and Cross Plaintiffs 
vs. 
DONALD D. RAWLINGS and JEANETTE 
RAWLINGS and DONALD RAWLINGS and 
JEANETTE RAWLINGS as Trustees of a 
Trust whose name is unknown and ARNOLD 
DWAYNE RAWLINGS and PAULETTE 
RAWLINGS and ARNOLD DWAYNE 
RAWLINGS and PAULETTE RAWLINGS, 
as Trustees of a Trust whose name is 
unknown, 
Third Party Defendants. 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on March 12-15, 2007 for a bifurcated 
bench trial pioceedmg on the issue of imposing a constructive trusf Following the presentation of 
evidence and by agreement, each of the parties submitted aPost-Trial Memorandum marshaling then 
arguments regarding the evidence and the law on the issue. Having considered the parties' 
respective memorandums, the evidence presented at trial, and havihg heretofore entered its ruling 
2 
on the bifurcated issue, the Court now makes and enters the fallowing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on the issue of constructive trust: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Arnold J. Rawlings (hereinafter "Arnold") and Cleo Rawlings (hereinafter "Cleo") 
had five children who are, in order of birth, Donald Rawlings (hereinafter ''Donald"), Arnold 
Dwayne Rawlings (hereinafter "Dwayne"), Theron LaRell Rawlings (hereinafter "LaReLT), Bryce 
C. Rawlings (hereinafter "Bryce"), and Carol Lynn Rawlings Mastcrson (hereinafter "Carol"). 
2. Arnold Rawlings acquired the property from his mother in 1944, From that time until 
the time of his death, his wife Cleo's name was not on the title to the property at issue in this case. 
Clco has no ownership interest in the farm property, 
3. Arnold solely owned approximately 22.37 acres of property in Orem. Arnold sold 
12 acres, leaving approximately 10.37 acres. 
4 Tn 1962 Arnold deeded property roughly adjacentl to Arnold's home to Dwayne 
Rawlings and spouse on which they built a home. Tn 1967 a very small piece was deeded to Dwayne 
and spouse by Arnold between the property where Arnold's honje was and where Dwayne and 
spouse built there home. In 1960 Arnold deeded to Donald and spouse apropeity slightly to the west 
of the property deeded to Dwayne. Donald built his home on that broperty. Adjacent to the home 
on which Donald btiilthis home, Amolddeeded in 1964 property to Donald which has been referred 
to as the barn property, hi 1967 Arnold deeded to Dwayne and spouse two parcels, one south of 
Dwayne's home ("the garden") and the other south of the barn property ("the orchard"). 
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5. In 1963 the farm was pledged to Walker Bank and Trust Company on a Trust Deed 
(Exhibit 8) 
6. in 1964 that indebtedness was rewritten as a Conditional Sales Contract with the 
pledge of a Ford trust and an Oldsmobile automobile. 
7. The transaction consisted of a rewriting of the loan with the replacement of security 
8. By October of 1966, Arnold had been diagnosed with cancer which ultimately 
required medical attention. 
9. Prior to December 16, 1966, Donald Rawlings talked to the Welfare Department 
about hi s intention to have his father transfer the farm property to him. That intent was conoborated 
by Exhibit 68, a letter from the Welfare Department refemng to a prior meeting, and provides proff 
of the intent to transfer before the alleged payment of the Walker Bank debt. 
10. On December 22,2006, Arnold was operated on to remove a large cancerous tumor, 
following which he labored to recover from his illness, 
11. in January of 1967, Arnold began a series of 20 cobalt treatments. The medical 
attention that Arnold required was extremely expensive. Arnold lacked resources to pay for the 
medical treatment and received welfare assistance. 
12 Donald Rawlings discussed his intention to transfer Arnold's property into Donald's 
name (see Exhibit S, a letter dated December 16, 1966, from the Ui^\ County Department of Public 
Welfare to Donald Rawlings). 
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13. The letter from the Welfare Department was addressed to Donald, not to Arnold or 
Geo, the persons receiving the benefits from the Welfare Department pertaining to his illness. 
14 The Utah County Department of Public Welfare (hereinafter "Welfare Department1') 
would pay the majority of themedical expenses associated with Arnold's illness if Arnold's property 
was not m his name (other than Arnold's home). 
15. Arnold was admitted to the Utah Valley Hospital for additional medical treatment on 
February 16, 1967. Arnold was admitted to the Utah Valley Hospital again for yet more medical 
treatment on March 14, 1967. 
16. The undisputed testimony is that Arnold's health steadily deteiiorated and he was 
in very poor health on March 24,1967. He was somewhat advanced in age. He had an eighth grade 
or less education and was very concerned that the trust property would be lost to the Welfare 
Department. 
17. Pursuant to a Warranty Deed dated and recorded wi^h the Utah County Recorder on 
March 24, 1967, Arnold deeded the property referred to as the farnij property or the trust property to 
Donald and spouse. Exhibit 12 is a copy of the deed and a plat of the legal description. Although 
Cleo's signature appears thereon, Cleo had no ownership interest in the trust property, and there was 
no testimony given as to why she executed any deed that was offered into evidence in this mallei 
18. On March 24,1967, Arnold conveyed by Warranty Deed tliree parcel s to D wayne and 
spouse. This deed, with plats as to each of the tliree parcels, was admitted as Exhibits 14, 15, and 
16. The undisputed testimony was that parcel I was a small portidn between Arnold's homes and 
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Dwayne's home which Arnold had sometime earlier sold to DWayne and spouse. Furthei, the 
undisputed testimony was that parcel 2 on Exliibits 14, 15, and 16 has been continuously held by 
Dwayne as part of the constructive trust property for and on behalf of the family members to be 
distributed as the Court orders. 
19. On March 24,1967, a Quit-Claim Deed (hereinafter ''the sibling deed") was signed 
by Dwayne and spouse, LaRell and spouse, Carol, and Bryce and spouse to Donald and spouse. This 
sibling deed contained a legal description for the trust property. Ov^r time, small neighboring pieces 
of property were added to the trust property in various deeds signed by Donald's siblings and most 
sibling spouses. 
20 The undi sputed testimony is that the operation of the trust property or the family farm 
continued exactly the same before and after March 247 1967, except that, because of Arnold's 
weakened physical condition, sometimes he could do very little work. Donald also testified on uoss 
examination, when confronted with his deposition testimony, that Although Arnold would go down 
to the property and Dwayne, Bryce, and LaRell helped on the property "all 1 (Donald) know is that 
I didn't." 
21. On cross examination Donald also admitted, when confronted with his deposition 
testimony, that Arnold continued to have property until 1970. 
22. After Arnold's death, Donald consistently represented to his siblings that income 
from the trust property was being used to support their mother. 
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23. Both before and after March 24, 1967, and both before and after Arnold's death, 
Donald's siblings, sometimes their spouses and sometimes their children, worked in the orchaid o.i 
the trust property, the work done after Arnold's death was with the understanding that the income 
was to be used to support Geo, 
24. hi 1974, the Vineyard Meadows Subdivision was developed adjacent to the south 
boundary line of the trust property (see Exhibit 1) As it was developed, fences were placed in the 
backyards of the homes in Vineyard Meadows Subdivision, generally along the south boundary line 
of the trust property. Donald told Dwayne that the fences in tfhose backyards encroached upon 
"Mother's farm " At Donald's request, and for the purpose of protecting "Mother's farm/' Dwayne 
and his son worked with Donald and his son to place a fence though the backyards of the home 
owners in that subdivision to show where the boundary line for "Mother's farm" was. Dwayne 
regularly attended his Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saintiward with the people who lived in 
those homes. He and his spouse were friends with those home owhers. Nevertheless, the undisputed 
testimony is, in order to assist in the protection of the family fariti or trust property, Dwayne and his 
son placed fencing in those yards Ultimately, the litigation surrounding (he boundary dispute was 
resolved. Donald caused some of the funds from the settlements to be delivered to his siblings 
(LaRell refused the portion offered to him) and to be used for Cleo's support This included the 
purchase of a car, 
25. As pari of this boundary dispute with Vineyard Meadows Subdivision home owneis. 
Donald convinced his siblings co^ign another deed in 1974, which he explained to them contained 
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a legal description only of the disputed area. The deed named Donald and spouse as grantees, hi 
fact, it contained a much larger legal description that included all of the trust property. If, in fact, 
Donald and spouse had owned the property before, no such deed would have been necessary. 
26. In April of 1978, Donald and spouse deeded a % interest in a portion of the trust 
properly to Dwayne and spouse. This property appears as Exhibit 1 as the Pinegar property. The 
Pinegar property was then deeded as part of a 1031 exchange to and Mrs, Jack Hadley and M L 
and Mrs. Merrill Gappmayer. Out of that exchange, Donald and spouse and Dwayne and spouse 
were deeded property located on Mountain Way Drive and 400 South in Orem, which was referred 
to throughout the Trial as the industrial property. The Pinegar property was credited as a 1/3 down 
payment, or $15,000.00 of the $45,000.00 purchase price of the industrial property. The balance of 
the purchase price was paid for, $15,000.00 by Donald and spouse and $15,000.00 by Dwayne and 
spouse through loans obtained by the respective parties. 
27 Donald and Jeanette assert that they paid $579.06 to Walker Bank on December 29, 
2966, upon which the bank surrendered its conditional sales contract. (Exhibit 9) 
28. The conditional sales contract was stamped "pai^." 
29. The conditional contract shows that it was a stamped "paid" on December 15,1966 
altered by ink to show a date of December 29, 1966. 
30 By the terms of the conditional sales constract, the bank's l emedy was a i ecomse to 
the automobile company under a full recourse clause. 
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31. In addition, the bank had a security interest in the Ford truck and Oldsmobile which 
could have been foreclosed and taken m satisfaction of the remaining debt. Tf a foreclosure of the 
trust deed was imminent, the bank would have had to record a Notice of Default and wait 90 days 
to for the debtors to cure the default before the Notice of Sale could have been published. No such 
recording was ever produced and is not a record in the Utah County Recorder's Office 
32. No evidence was presented that the check for $579.06 was the required loan payoff 
amount. 
33. Jcanettc (Donald's spouse) testified that she and Donald had indebtedness with 
Walker Bank and Trust Company for the building of their home at the same time period. 
34. In 1966 and 1967, Donald and spouse had loans with the Walker Bank. Commencing 
June 29, 1966, Donald and spouse made the following payments, by check, to Walker Bank. 
DATE 
June 29, 1966 
July 19,2966 
August 10, 1966 
September 21, 1966 
October 19, 1966 
November 21, 1966 
December 29, 1966 
| T O T A L 
AMOUNT | 
$150 00 
100 00 
100.00 
100.00 
100 00 
100.00 
579.06 
$1,229.06! 
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35. Donald and Jeanette5 s banking records offered into evidence dming the trial i evealed 
no other payments to Walker Bank during the time frame, in spite of uncontroverted testimony ,f 
Jeanette Rawlings, that Donald and spouse had other loans upon which payments would have been 
made with Walker Bank and trust during that time frame. 
36. Jeanette also testified that the bank gave her a reconveyance on the trust deed (Exhibit 
9) at the same time. Thai testimony, however, is unpersuasive. 
37 The deeding ofthe trust property to Donald and Jeanette occurred on March 24,1967, 
some three months after the alleged payment ofthe Walker Bank debt by Plaintiffs. 
38. After the litigation commenced, Donald's spouse, Jeannette Rawlings, altered the 
checks evidencing the above payments, by adding language on pach of them to indicate they were 
paid to Walker Bank and Trust Company for and on behalf of Arnold Rawlings It was only du.mg 
the May 97 2005 deposition of Jeannette Rawlings (Donald's spouse) thai she admitted to the 
alteration ofthe documentary evidence, by notations made after'this suit was filed, for the purpose 
of designating those checks as checks paid on Arnold Rawlings3 account 
39 Noting those circumstances, the Court is unpersijadcd that the Plaintiffe9 assei uons 
regarding the December 29, 1966, check and concludes the Plaintiffs3 statements are not suppoited 
by the records and the evidence. 
40. The Court is unpeisuaded that the fami was deeded by the parties' father to Donald 
and Jeanette because of die payment ofthe alleged indebtedness. 
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41. During trial, neither Donald nor Jeancttc testified t}ie reason for the deed was because 
they had paid off the loan. 
42. No testimony was presented of any agreement between Donald and his falhei that the 
farm was deeded because of payment of the indebtedness. 
43. LaRell Rawlings testified that in late February otj early March that his father had a 
conversation with him m which Arnold suggested he needed to| get the property out of Arnold's 
name because of the Welfare Department's requirement that it be transferred out of his name. 
44. LaRell suggested il be placed in Dwayne's name £is he would be most fair with the 
family. 
45. At a later meeting in Salt Lake City at a restaurant with both Donald and Arnold 
present, Arnold indicated that he was going to deed the property to Donald because of the Welfare 
requnemenl for receiving assistance. 
46. That conversation (see Pai agraph 45) was in the presence of Donald, was undisputed 
by Donald at trial, and remains uncontradicted and unrebntted. 
47 No mention was made in that conveisation of any payment of the Walker Bank debt 
or any reason for deeding the property because of the Walker Baijik debt. 
48 One ox two days before Mary 24,1967, the date the trust property was deeded, Donald 
and Arnold met with Dwayne Rawlings and informed him that thdy were deeding the ti usl piopei ty 
to Donald because Aniold needed to get the trust piopeity out of his name, consistent with other 
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concerns regarding welfare assistance, but no mention was made that such transfer had anything io 
do with any payment of the Walker Bank and Trust debt. 
49. No where in this proceeding have Donald or Jeanette testified disputing that the 
testimony of Dwayne to the meeting two days before the conveyance of the trust property. 
50. Li January of 1967, Donald told Dwayne that Arnold needed money for taxes on the 
trust property, Dwayne borrowed $1,000.00 from the credit union at Geneva Steel and endorsed that 
check to Donald for the purpose of making payments on the taxe|s which Donald aheged weie due 
on the trust property. Donald did not deliver this $1,000,00 t]o the Utah County Assessor foi 
payment of real estate taxes until after the trust property was conveyed to Donald and spouse to hold. 
51. If the March 24, 1967, deed had been intended to transfer ownership to Donald for 
the payment of the Walker Bank debt in December of 1966, Arnold would not have been concerned 
about paying the back taxes, as it would be Donald's responsibility. 
52. On March 24,1967, Donald and spouse caused $11267,00 ($1,000.00 of which was 
paid by Dwayne) to be paid to the Utah County Assessor's Office pn the trust property and on oiher 
piopeities owned by Donald and spouse. 
53. It is unrebutted that Carol, Bryce, LaRell, and Dwayne were all told that the March 
24, 1967, conveyance to Donald and spouse was because Arnold had to get the property out of his 
name as required by the Welfare Department. 
54. Plaintiffs did not produce any peisuasivc lestimoriy contradicting the testimony of 
Carol, Bryce, LaRell, and Dwayne on that subject. 
12 
55. There has been inadequate explanation by Donald] and spouse as to why the siblings 
and their spouses, with the exception of Carol's husband, were Risked to sign the March 247 1967 
Quit-Claim Deed, Exhibit 12. 
56. After March 24,1967, deed, Arnold continued to treat the faun as his own. 
57. Bryce Rawlings testified that his father signed thei March 24, 1967, deed to Donald 
and spouse intending only to make it a temporary transfer, withjthe children to receive thcrcaltcr 
their expected shares of the farm. 
58. In February of 1970, LaRell was in the military. Arnold asked that the military 
release or discharge LaRell early to help on Arnold's farm, the trust property. Tn that regard, the 
Court admitted the following into evidence: 
a. Exhibit 22, a letter from Kent Stewart ojf the Utah State Department of 
Highways, which stated m part* 
"With LaRell's brothers either unable or unwilling to help their father with his farm, 
the future would be veiy precarious for him financially . .
 t in my opinion the only 
way Arnold Rawlings could operate his farm is with the full time help of his son, 
LaRell . " 
b Exhibit 23, a letter dated February 18, 1976, addressed to the commanding 
officer of Dugway Proving Grounds and signed by Darryl M. Williajms, MD. The letter first explains 
that Arnold has had a diagnosis of lymphosarcoma and states- "'Mi Rawlings complains of 
generalized symptoms that apparently prevent him from carrying <}n his normal work as a farmer " 
Doctor Williams goes on the state thai Arnold "does at this present time have evidence of 
active disease; the prognosis in this instance must be considered guarded." 
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c. Exhibit 24, a letter from Dr. Watson L. JLaflerty dated Febmary 16, 1970, 
states, in part: 
"Mr Rawlings has been under my care for one year, fwith a cronic [sic] health 
condition and is unable to do his farming. Due to his inability to do the hard labor 
which is necessary to operate his farm the need for his son is very urgent." 
d. Exhibit 25 is a letter dated February 16, 1970 and signed by the Honorable 
Merrill L. Hemiansen, Third District Juvenile Court, State of Utah- Judge Hermansen explains that 
he hecame acquainted with Arnold's medical condition because Aniold and Judge Hcrmmisen were 
confined in Utah Valley Hospital at the same time. Judge Hermlanscn goes on to slate: 
"I am aware that he is disabled with cancer and that he has as his only means of 
support the operation of a small farm also located in the Orem area. His illness 
makes it impossible for him to operate this farm, and it is almost his only income, 
I would therefore recommend that a hardship discharge be granted to The* "a [sic] 
LaRell Rawlings in order that he may take care of this urgent family problem, to wit: 
that of the support of his mother and father." 
e. A letter dated February 10, 1970 addressed to the U.S. Army and wnltun to 
Leo G. Meredith, manager of Chipman's Mercantile Company in American Fork, Utah Mi 
Meieduh slates: 
"[LaRell] and [Arnold],..have operated together in a project of raising fruit, together 
with pleasure horses for sale. The Father is working under a handicap of a health 
problem to a point where he is unable to do any of the work connected with breaking 
and training the horses for sale, nor is he able to do any ofthe heavy work related to 
the production ofthe fruit and the sale of thereof." 
f Exhibit 27 is a sworn statement of Glen fyterrill dated Febmary 20, 1970 
Therein he states: 
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"[Arnold] is unable to take care of his orchard and small I farm. (Arnold] has no one 
who is free to help him. He has a single son, LaRell, who lived with his mother and 
father and attend to these necessary duties but is now! in the Army stationed at 
Dug way, Utah. 
"I believe it would be better for all concerned if LaRell could be released to again 
look after the welfare of his aging and sick parents. Thi$ is a hardship case." 
g. Exhibit28 is a letter from the Honorable NQall T. Wootlon. Mr, Wootton was 
an attorney who practice for many years in Utah County but whopfissed away in 2006. Mr. Wootton 
makes the following affirmative representations to the commanding officer of Dugway Proving 
Grounds: 
(1) He represents Arnold. 
(2) Arnold is disabled with cancer. 
(3) Arnold's sole source of support is a 104acre farm which he operates. 
(4) Without the aid of LaRell, Arnold and Cleo are going to suffer extieme 
hardships. 
h. Exhibit 29 is a letter dated January 14, 19J70, from Ray E. Gammon. Mr. 
Gammon was a long-time attorney hi Utah County who is now retired. Mr. Gammon makes the 
following affirmative representations: 
(1) He has known LaRell and his family foil the past several years 
(2) LaRell has taken care of the family orchard. 
(3) Arnold has been and is receiving treatment for cancer. 
(4) Arnold is unable to care for the farm. 
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58. hi addition to doctors, lawyers, a judge, and businessmen, Arnold, himself, executed 
not one but two affidavits. 
a. Exhibit 19 is an affidavit executed by Arnold dated February 13,1970. hi the 
February 13, 1970 affidavit, Arnold swears: 
"that he his engaged as a farmer, Livestock Raiser, and for many years has been 
dependenl upon his son, Theron LaRell Rawlings, to assjist him in the operation of 
his farm/' 
'That the undersigned is 64 years of age and is severely qfflicted with cancer and is 
able to do but little of the work required for the operation (f>f his farm, and he is badly 
in need of the services of said son to assist him in the planting, cultivating, irrigating, 
and harvesting of his crops and in caring for his livestock 
b. Exhibit 20 is Arnold's second affidavit. In| that affidavit Arnold swears that: 
(1) He has health pioblems which makes it impossible to do the hard labor 
required by the farm 
(2) Last fall he lost several hundred bushelsof peai s because he could not get 
them picked and to market in time. 
(3) That he has three other boys living in \\~ie area, but that he had not been 
getting any help from them. 
(4) That LaRell had stayed at home and helped since his illness a few years 
ago, and that LaRell was the only one he could turn to at that tim0 
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59. The letters referred to in paragraph 57 and tl^ e affidavits of Arnold Rawhngs 
(paragraph 58) make it clear that the farm was still Arnold's. Thet only purpose for deeding the farm 
into Donald's name could have been for protection against the ^elfare Department. 
60. Exhibits 52 and 57 are Arnold's medical records fpr December 1966 through March 
1871969. The medical records note that on February 16, 1967, $hortly before the execution of the 
deeds which create the constructive trust in this matter, that Arnold was admitted to the hospital 
because of his inability to care for himself at home. Arnold had presented mi immediate distress 
from an abscessed area of his right grom. 
61. The medical records make it clear that after the December 22,1966 surgery, Arnold 
underwent approximately 20 treatments of high energy radiotherapy (cobalt 60) and that the dosage 
administered was approximately 400 RAD (TD), They go on to $ay: 
"Subsequently, the patient did well until 1967. At thalt time, dunng a routine 
followup examination, the patient was noted to nave bi-latcral axillaiy 
lymphadenopathy as well as evidence of "chest involverapnt." Because of this, he 
was again treated with cobalt therapy at St. Maries Hospital m December 1967." 
62. Arnold did not consider the conveyance to be a transfer of his ownership rights m the 
property. 
63. Arnold also requested and procured help from a n|umber of people supporting his 
request to have LaRcll discharged from the military to help him wbrk "his" farm, as referenced by 
Exhibits 22, and 24-29, 
64. After the March 24, 1967, deed, Donald did not hel^ in fanning the trust propeity ot 
his father 
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65. On March 1, 1971, Arnold Rawlings died. 
66. During all of Arnold's lifetime, all of the income from the trust propeity went to 
Arnold. After Arnold's death, Donald consistently representee} to Ins siblings that the income from 
the trust property was being used to support their mother. 
67. On March 30, 1971, Cleo Rawlings, his widow, paid the taxes on 8.84 acres, which 
included all of the trust property. 
68. Such evidence also supports the factual conclusion that Cleo likewise believed the 
farm (the trust property) was the family farm. 
69. Prior to Arnold's death, Bryce Rawlings requested permission from Arnold to put a 
trailer on the trust property for a residence. Arnold showed Bryce where on the trust property to 
place the trailer, and Bryce lived in the trailer on the farm (the trust property) for four or five years 
following his father's death. This evidence supports the conclusion that the parties considered the 
farm a family farm. 
70 Donald enlisted Dwayne's help to install a fence upon the determined fence line 
across the encroaching developed properties of neighboring owners and then negotiated with the title 
companies of the subdivided lots settlements for approximately $52,000.00. (See paragi aph 24 
above.) 
71. From these proceeds, Donald gave $500 to Carol, $500 to Bryce, and $600 to 
Dwayne, with approximately $5,000 for a care and prepayment of burial funds for Cleo. He offered 
$500 to LaRell winch LaRell refused. 
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72. Donald testified that the 1974 Quit-Claim Deed was not to convey any interest in the 
property from his siblings but was only to clear up the title problem on the south boundary. The 
Court is unpersuaded by Donald's testimony. 
73. In 1978 Donald and Jeanette deeded a half interest in the lot known as the Pwegar 
Lot to Dwayne and Paulette. 
74. In 1993 Donald traded a property known as the Hellwell property, shown as Exhibit 
1, for 6.5 acres in Washington County, Utah. It was only after Dwayne became aware of the 
Hellwell trade that Donald or his spouse, for the first time, told any sibling they believed they owned 
the trust property, and they were using the funds or income from the trust property in any way they 
chose. 
75. The work of all the family members on the farm, except Donald, on the irrigating, 
harvesting, and marketing of the fruit, the management of the horses and the proceeds of the fruit 
being given to the mother, Cleo, the wailing of so long to take action by the siblings is readily 
apparent by the trust thai they had in their older brother (Donald) that he would do what was right, 
but by his own actions during the period following the conveyance all demonstrate the farm as a 
family faun. 
76. The testimony is undisputed that Donald co-mingled the fluids from the trust property 
with his other funds and is unable to distinguish any funds which he spent at any time from March 
24, 1967 to the day of trial as to their source whether they came from the trust property income oi 
from income from some other source. 
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77. The evidence in this matter is persuasive and convincing to support the conclusion 
that the siblings waited a long period of time, given their trust in their older brother that he would 
do what was right for the family, and as buttressed by their own[actions during the peuod following 
the conveyance. 
78 The Court finds that there is no just reason for jielay of entry of a final judgment 
consistent with the findings and conclusions herein. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact by the Court, the Court now makes and enters the 
following conclusions of law: 
1. The March 24, 1967, deed from Arnold and Cleo Rawlings to Donald and Jeanette 
Rawlings was not for the payment of debt to Walker Bank and Tuist Company or for the payment 
of taxes. 
2. The deed transfer was for accommodation and not intended to transfer ownership to 
Donald and Jeanette Rawlings 
3. The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the foregoing findings of fact 
establish a equitable need to impose a constructive trust on the property conveyed in the 1967 deeds 
and the 1974 deeds 
4 The actions regarding the property by Donald and Jeanette are for the benefit of the 
trust property. 
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5. From the inception of the trust, Donald Rawlings and Jeanette Rawlings received 
unjust enrichment of the propeity which they treated as their own wliich included $1,000.00 of the 
roughly $1,200.00 taxes that were paid by Dwayne and his spojise, the barn property, the proceeds 
from the operation of the trust propeity, and approximately $52,000.00 from negotiated payments 
regarding the south boundary fence dispute as well as other benefits from the use and negotiations 
relative to the trust property. 
6. The Court concludes that it should enter a final Judgment on the issue that was tried 
as to a constructive trust and directs the entry of a judgment onlthe constructive trust issue pursuant 
to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED and SIGNED this 2 j ? day of August, 200^ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
BY THE COURT 
' -.;.\,/<-. .n*t-
M. David Eckersly 
ROBINSON, SEILERS, & ANDERSON 
JOL^-
Thomas W. Seiler 
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